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ABSTRACT

Institutional Adaptation to Water Scarcity
in Utah Irrigation Companies

by

Grant Patty, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2018

Major Professor: Dr. Randy T. Simmons
Department: Economics
A review of how water institutions in the American West have changed in
response to arid conditions as a means of examining the possibility of further change as
an adaptation to climate change induced water scarcity. Two institutions are examined,
prior appropriation and shares.
While much of the American West operates under prior appropriation formally,
irrigators have found Coasian methods of lowering transaction costs by forming irrigation
companies. Irrigation companies own appropriative rights and redefine them, typically as
shares. Lower transaction costs allow irrigators to trade more freely within companies,
though trades between companies still face high transaction costs.
Using a dataset of Utah’s 1100+ irrigation companies collected from the Utah
Division of Water Rights, I measure the extent to which these companies have
internalized transaction costs. Because most, if not all, irrigation companies transform
appropriative rights into some form of shares, regions facing more water scarcity should
be more likely to manage water by using shares rather than appropriative rights. I test the
hypothesis that an increase in water scarcity makes trade more valuable and thereby
increases the relative opportunity costs of managing a river through appropriative rights
versus shares.

(40 pages)
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INTRODUCTION
“The Coasean solution to a Coasean property rights problem is the firm, and the
settlers of the West turned to the firm [...] to reduce transaction costs associated with
irrigation.” (Bretsen & Hill, 2006, p. 286)
“By the very act of organizing into larger groups, individuals can often gain
considerable political power over state and federal water policy.” (Thompson, 1993, p.
681)

Much of the literature on water institutions in the American West has focused on
both the innovative efficiencies and path-dependent inefficiencies of prior appropriation
(Johnson, Gisser, & Werner, 1981; Libecap, 2007, 2011; Leonard & Libecap, 2017;
Edwards & Libecap, 2015; Heinmiller, 2009). The transaction costs from beneficial use
and multiple owners of return flows have been well documented (Burness & Quirk, 1979,
1980; Bretsen & Hill, 2009). A focus on how the formal, legal institutions that govern
water impose transaction costs is incomplete without examining how irrigators have
innovated institutional arrangements that reduce these transaction costs. The most
important of these institutional arrangements are irrigation companies and irrigation
districts.
Although some scholars have turned their attention to irrigation companies and
districts, there is a lack of quantitative work that tests how these institutions have been
created as a response to the arid conditions that increase the transaction costs of prior
appropriation. The following is a test of the hypothesis that irrigators in Utah have
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created institutions that reduce transaction costs as a response to the state’s arid climate.
The empirical analysis presented here offers evidence that this is the case.

INSTITUTIONS FOR GOVERNING WATER
How Institutions Change
Like other resources, water is managed through institutions, which Nobel
Laureate Douglass North (1991) defined as the “humanly devised constraints that
structure political, economic and social interaction” (p. 97). Institutions that manage
water structure how people are able to obtain, use, and trade water. Property rights, like
other institutions, are often established out of a need to encourage investment by reducing
uncertainty over who has the right to use resources. Frequently, the process of
establishing of property rights involves negotiation and contracting among the many
users of the resource (Libecap, 1989). In other cases, property rights are imposed by
higher-level institutions.
The outcome of this process can produce long-lasting constraints on the plausible
choices available to future users of the resource. North (1990) argues that institutions can
have considerable staying power as people adapt to them. Adaptation includes learning
how the institution works and what opportunities are available. Entrepreneurs, both
economic and political, pursue opportunities afforded by current institutions. When these
opportunities depend on the continued existence of the institutions that created them,
entrepreneurs can become vested interests who devote resources into preserving the
institutional status quo. This process of institutions creating space for interests that
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protect them can make long-standing institutions exceptionally difficult to change, a state
often termed “institutional lock-in” (Garrick, Whitten, & Coggan, 2013; North, 1990).
When change does come, it is frequently sparked by changes that come from
outside the institutions themselves. These changes can be described as price shocks,
because they change the opportunity cost, or price, of preserving the institutional status
quo. Potential sources of price shocks can include new technologies, climate and
environmental change, or demographic and cultural shifts. When the potential
opportunities offered by alternative institutions become greater than the costs of
maintaining current institutions, entrepreneurs have an incentive to invest in institutional
change (Edwards & Libecap, 2015).
Importantly, it is not enough for alternative institutions to offer superior sets of
opportunities. The benefits of the new institutions must be greater than the benefits
offered by current institutions after the costs of transitioning to the new institution are
accounted for. Institutional “lock-in” can substantially increase the costs of changing
institutions (Garrick, Whitten, & Coggan, 2013).
Institutional change is difficult to achieve and there is no guarantee that it will be
beneficial. Considerations of costs and benefits to change only matter to those who have
the ability to cause change, or in price terms, those who can afford to invest in the costs
of changing the institution. The public choice model of “politics as exchange” illustrates
that lower-level institutional change, when pursued within a set of political institutions, is
subject to the constraints imposed by politics. This leaves open the real possibility that
price shocks may not always lead to beneficial institutional change when short-sighted
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policymakers, an uninformed public, and vested interest groups have the ability to exploit
price shocks for their own benefit.

How Water Institutions Have Evolved

Property rights over water have been the primary institution used to allocate water
resources in the American West. Property rights can be defined in many different ways,
however, and not all ways of defining them are equally well suited to every
environmental or economic goal. Accordingly, how water rights are defined matters a
great deal in determining how people will use, or not use, water resources, which in turn
determines how their economies and communities grow and develop.
Property rights over water have taken many forms, but three ways of defining
water rights, riparian rights, appropriative rights, and water shares, have been used widely
throughout the English-speaking world. Accordingly, these three institutions will be
compared here. The effects of path dependence mean that understanding the possibility of
institutional change requires understanding how these institutions were developed in the
first place. Two regions are particularly instructive, the American West and Australia’s
Murray-Darling Basin, as both redefined property rights over water from riparian rights
to either appropriative rights or water shares (Heinmiller, 2009). The different approaches
taken by each country resulted in differing abilities to capture gains from trade (Grafton,
Libecap, Edwards, O’Brian, & Landry, 2012) and respond to drought (Garrick, Whitten,
& Coggan, 2013).
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Riparian Rights

Riparian rights are a fairly simple way to structure water use. Under this
institution, anyone who owns land adjacent to a stream has the right to withdraw as much
water as they need from a stream so long as they do not impact the ability of other
similarly-adjacent users to do the same. Riparian rights were developed in the relatively
wet climate of England and are a traditional feature of English common law. As the
British colonized other parts of the world, including Australia and North America, they
brought with them their legal institutions, including riparian rights.
In a climate where water is abundant, riparian rights can work fairly well. If
precipitation is frequent and bodies of water are common, then most users will have
access to ample water. In more arid regions, however, the requirement that all water users
be adjacent to the source of the water they use makes riparian rights ill-suited for
economic growth and development. This was the problem faced by the colonizers of the
American West. While the eastern United States had enough water abundance for
riparian rights to be viable, the arid western landscape did not. Precipitation was rare,
rivers were few and far between, and water was often needed far from where it was
available. In response, the colonizers developed a new institution, prior appropriation,
which evolved from private decentralized agreements that eventually were formally
codified.

Prior Appropriation
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Property rights for water, as defined by prior appropriation, guarantee the owner a
fixed volume of water (typically measured in acre-feet1) so long as all others whose rights
have priority receive their full allocation first. The priority of these rights is ordered by
seniority, in the order in which they were established by diverting water from the source.
Along a given source of water, such as a river, rights that were created from early
diversions are referred to as “senior” water rights, and those that were created from later
diversion are referred to as “junior” water rights. Because those at the front of the line
receive their full quantity first, they are generally likely to receive their allocation even
under drought conditions, while those at the end may be lucky to ever see any water at
all.
Gary Libecap, and others, have extensively traced the origins of prior
appropriation rights in the American west (Libecap, 2007; Libecap, 2011; Leonard &
Libecap, 2017). Early colonizers of the western US faced climate and governance
conditions entirely unlike what they had experienced in the eastern half of the country.
The semi-arid climate required diverting water to where it would be used, often over long
distances. This was especially true for industries like mining, where water was needed far
from the only available sources. Not surprisingly, miners were some of the first water
users to abandon riparian rights in favor of prior appropriation.
The change from riparian rights to prior appropriation was rapid and greatly
contributed to the American West’s economic development. Prior appropriation gave
entrepreneurs confidence that investments they made would be secure. It allowed the
creation of contracts and trade among the new colonizers, facilitating discovery of the
1

An acre-foot is enough water to cover an acre of land in a foot of water, or about 325,851 gallons.
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most productive uses of the region’s natural resources (Leonard & Libecap, 2017). As
more people moved to the region, emerging state governments codified prior
appropriation rights, endowing the privately developed institution with the force of law.

Water Shares

The British colonizers of Australia faced similar challenges as the those in the
American West. Riparian rights were not a useful way to define property rights in the dry
climate of Australia. Change only materialized after a number of factors came together in
the 19th century, including urban populations unable to easily obtain the water they
needed through riparian rights, rural settlers facing conflicts over who had the right to use
water, and miners making heavy use of water in the mid-century gold rush (Ward, 2009).
These conflicts came to a head in the 1886 Irrigation Act, which granted each
state full ownership and control over water within its boundaries. The act rejected both
riparian rights and prior appropriation, which had been established in the western US by
this time, in favor of centralized administration of water (Ward, 2009). Users were
granted privileges, known as entitlements, to appropriate a certain percentage of the
yearly flow, but were unable to sell or trade these entitlements without also selling the
land where the water was used. States issued entitlements to private individuals and
organizations guided by an explicit goal of maximum water resource utilization and
economic development (National Water Commission, 2011).
Prior appropriation was developed in the mid 19th century before state and federal
governments had the ability to project power and enforce contracts over the large areas of
the west. The relatively low enforcement costs required by prior appropriation made it an
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attractive institution. In contrast, Australia remained a British colony during this time and
did not reform its institution of riparian rights until the end of the 19th century. By that
time the government had the ability to monitor water usage, and could therefore
centralize water allocation, something that was not possible in the middle of the century
in western North America.
An Australian-style, centralized institution in the American West was unlikely,
given the conditions and technology available at the time of its colonization. As Libecap
(2011) notes, “Defining water rights in terms of shares rather than in fixed, diverted
quantities would have required knowledge of total flows, information only more recently
available” (p. 76). In Northian terms, defining property rights over water as a percentage
of the seasonal flow, as Australia did, did not lie within the American West’s
“opportunity set”.
The decentralized property rights developed in the American West differed
fundamentally from the centralized institutions developed in Australia’s Murray-Darling
basin. After abandoning riparian rights, the new Australian “rights” were not really rights
at all, and their name, entitlements, reflected this. They did not allow the owner to
modify, sell, or exchange them without also modifying, selling, or exchanging the land to
which the rights were attached. They were little more than the permission for an owner of
a particular piece of land to use a certain amount of water on that land (National Water
Commission, 2011). American water rights, on the other hand, often separated the
ownership of land from the use of water. While American water rights remained
usufructuary, they could be modified, sold, and exchanged separately from the land on
which they were used.
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Eventually a series of intense droughts combined with diminishing returns from
additional dams forced Australia to change water entitlements to water shares. This was
accomplished through a series of reforms that unbundled water use from land and
encouraged trade. The modern Australian water market is now one of the most active in
the world. It is unlikely that Australia’s successful wholesale institutional transformation
can be replicated in the American West, however. Australia’s National Water
Commission (2011) has noted that the centralized institution of water resource
management became “a significant precursor to the later establishment of clearly
specified and tradable water entitlements because it gave government the power to limit
total extractions and to define relatively homogenous rights to the resource” (p. 20). A
complete transformation to a water market based on shares may be more difficult when
“each right is different and location-specific,” (National Water Commission, 2011, p. 20)
as are rights in the American West.
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TRANSACTION COSTS OF
PRIOR APPROPRIATION
Adaptation of the American West’s water institutions happened in a much more
local, private way, than Australia’s complete overhaul. Institutional change was driven by
incentives to reduce the transaction costs inherited from prior appropriation. These costs
include unequal distribution of risks from drought, rules allowing third-party users to
block changes in water use if it would affect their water right, and in some cases, the
legal doctrine of beneficial use. The primary way these issues have been addressed is by
associations of users contracting to form private irrigation companies, and later by voting
to form public irrigation districts. These organizations purchased appropriative rights and
redefined them, typically as shares. Redefining appropriative rights to shares alleviated
many of the transaction costs inherent in prior appropriation, at least within the
organizations. Consequently, water trade in the American West within irrigation
companies and districts (where transaction costs have been internalized) is more common
in than the formal rules of prior appropriation allow (Grafton, Libecap, Edwards,
O’Brian, & Landry, 2012).
Beneficial use, colloquially known as “use-it-or-lose-it”, stipulates that water can
only be used for a “beneficial” use as defined by the state. This was originally developed
to protect from speculators diverting an entire water source with the sole intention of
selling it back to later users at a monopolistic price. If a user does not put their water right
toward a use that the state designates as beneficial, the state revokes the right. This has
the unintentional effect of encouraging wasteful uses of water and discouraging
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investments in efficiency, as water users cannot sell the water saved through conservation
efforts.
Because under prior appropriation water rights are prioritized in order of
seniority, holders of junior rights face more risk from drought than holders of senior
rights (Burness & Quirk, 1979; Burness & Quirk, 1980). Shares, on the other hand do not
face this problem. While allowing competitive markets under prior appropriation can
theoretically, in the long-run, see users trading this risk in a way that results in the same
risk distribution as shares, other aspects of prior appropriation, including rules that
protect holders of rights from third-party effects, make this uncommon in practice
(Johnson, Gisser, & Werner, 1981).
The inability to trade stems primarily from users that have rights over return
flows. Most uses of water do not consume all, or even most, of the resource. Water that is
not consumed generally flows back to the source from which it was diverted. Other
appropriators can then divert the return flows back from the source and incorporate it as
part of their own water right. If the original appropriator changes their use of water, by
selling it to another user, for example, any user whose right includes the return flows will
lose their use of that water, and is therefore legally entitled to challenge the sale. As the
American West developed over time, many overlapping and interconnected rights were
created. This has been described as a “tragedy of the anticommons” (Bretsen & Hill,
2009), in which many users all have a property right over the same resource, preventing
any change from occurring without the consent of all users.
There is likely no single best approach to overcome this problem. While one
possible solution is to redefine water rights from the amount diverted to the amount

12
consumed, this may encourage users to engage in uses that consume more water, and as
environmental law scholar Barton H. Thompson Jr. (1993) notes, “states would need to
calculate the return flows of all water rights immediately in order to quantify the
consumptive rights - a tremendous administrative chore that no state would want to
undertake without a compelling reason” (p. 707).
Much of the water literature has focused on changing the formal rules of the
game, such as eliminating beneficial use requirements, for example. Unfortunately, these
reforms are surface-level, and do not consider how local institutional innovations have
circumvented the formal limitations on water markets (Thompson, 1993). It remains a
possibility that in regions that have largely internalized the transaction costs of prior
appropriation, that legal reforms, while potentially beneficial, could do little to change
the actual opportunities and constraints faced by water users.
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HOW IRRIGATION COMPANIES
INTERNALIZE TRANSACTION COSTS
American water rights began as a decentralized system of property rights, and
cannot easily transition to the more efficient institution of shares as a result. As Libecap
(2011) argues about the western American development of water institutions:
The institutions that emerged to facilitate agriculture in response to the
region’s aridity raise the costs today of reallocating water to higher-valued
uses and of flexibly responding to hydrological uncertainty due to climate
change [...] these institutional restrictions on markets illustrate how past
arrangements to meet conditions of the time constrain contemporary
economic opportunities. They cannot be easily significantly modified or
replaced ex post. (p. 66)
Furthermore, Edwards and Libecap (2015) argue that “A shift from prior appropriation to
shares is unlikely to be widespread in the US West unless water becomes much more
valuable” (p. 468), and that “Only when the costs of the current arrangement become so
high that the status quo is no longer tenable will the rights system be changed
voluntarily” (p. 469). This is why obstacles to trade have been primarily overcome in a
decentralized way through the formation of irrigation companies.
The first private organizations to develop irrigation infrastructure were what
Bretsen and Hill (2006) refer to as “commercial” irrigation companies. They were often
speculative ventures that invested heavily in constructing the infrastructure required to
irrigate an area, with the expectation of charging monopolistic prices to the future
irrigators that would settle on the land served by the infrastructure. Commercial irrigation
companies were frequently backed by Eastern investors with little knowledge or expertise
in the difficulties of Western irrigation. As farmers began irrigating with water purchased
from commercial irrigation companies, many of these companies began to charge
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exorbitant fees or engage in predatory business practices toward those whom they
believed were captive customers. Bretsen and Hill (2006) cite an observer who noted that
commercial irrigation companies could sell land to a farmer, provide water while the
farmer improved their property for a few years, briefly cut off water to kill the farmer’s
crop, and then confiscate and resell the improved property when the farmer failed to
make their water payments. These short-term practices eventually destroyed commercial
irrigation companies when their customers realized they had both monopsony power to
refuse to purchase water, and political power to effectively outlaw commercial irrigation
companies (Bretsen & Hill, 2006).
Commercial irrigation companies financed much of the irrigation infrastructure
that developed the American West, but collapsed when they were unable to efficiently
manage and operate their own irrigation systems. In an effort to overcome the free-rider
problems that came with irrigation infrastructure, farmers formed mutual irrigation
companies to construct, maintain, and administer that infrastructure. Bretsen and Hill
(2006) argue that mutual irrigation companies were successful at “reducing or
eliminating transaction costs in areas where the commercial irrigation company had
failed” (p. 302). Mutual irrigation companies (referred to as simply “irrigation
companies” for the remainder of this paper) acquired appropriative water rights, either
from other companies or from the members themselves, and redefined those rights as
shares. These shares often did, and still do, represent a single acre-foot of water that can
be traded freely. Thompson (1993) notes that irrigation companies with plentiful water
supplies are more likely to have regulations that can discourage trade, but as water
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becomes scarcer, or as the opportunity costs of not allowing trade increases, they tend to
find innovative ways of lowering transaction costs.
Thompson (1993) argues that two important characteristics of irrigation
companies drove their adoption: ownership by the water users and vertical integration.
Local control enabled the water users to incorporate local knowledge about their region’s
particular geographic, climatic, or social attributes in their custom-designed “rules of the
game”. Vertical integration, an ownership structure where the users of water are also the
owners of the infrastructure that delivers it, allowed irrigators to avoid facing potential
monopoly pricing from the only source of nearby irrigation.
Towards the beginning of the 20th century, irrigators began to form, with the
blessing of state and local governments, larger public organizations known as irrigation
districts. Irrigation districts had many of the features of mutual irrigation companies but
with added powers that included “eminent domain, the power of taxation, the power to
issue bonds, and exemptions from state and federal income taxes” (Bretsen & Hill, 2006,
p. 316). As the federal Bureau of Reclamation began constructing large irrigation
projects, including dams and pipelines, it contracted with irrigation districts who gained
exclusive distribution rights to Reclamation water. Today, irrigation districts deliver
water to both individual water users and to irrigation companies who then reallocate the
water to their members.
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METHODOLOGY
My hypothesis is that irrigation companies will have control over more water in
regions that are more arid. Theoretical work by Burness and Quirk (1979; 1980) and
Johnson, Gisser, and Werner (1981) demonstrated that, along a river managed by prior
appropriation, an increase in water scarcity increases both the value of trade and the
relative opportunity costs of managing a river through appropriative rights rather than
through shares. Because most, if not all, irrigation companies transform appropriative
rights into some form of shares, regions facing more water scarcity should be more likely
to manage water by using shares rather than appropriative rights. In other words, because
the transaction costs of prior appropriation are greater in more arid regions, these same
regions should have internalized transaction costs to a greater extent.
I use a series of OLS regressions to test if this is the case. To do this, I use three
dependent variables. The first is the average acre-feet owned by a company in a county,
and the second and third are market concentration indices defined in terms of acre-feet
and irrigated acres, respectively. The independent variable of interest is the yearly
average precipitation in a county.
Utah has 29 counties. All data was aggregated by county, so each county is a
single observation in the following tests. Summary statistics for Utah can be found in
table 1.
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Table 1
Utah Counties Summary Statistics
Variable

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

Precipitation

29

19.307

9.181

6.560

47.140

Population

29

101,472.500

225,743.800

1,117

1,091,742

Acre-feet per Company

29

3,877.724

5,691.112

0.000

25,898.130

Acre-feet - HHI

29

5,089.620

3,233.563

0.000

10,000.000

Acreage - HHI

29

4,825.514

3,493.896

0.000

10,000.000

Subsidy per Farm

29

8,007.724

4,192.045

2,371

20,572

Farm Sales

29

116,528.000

190,123.800

17,906

1,041,519

Median Farm Size

29

75.103

114.081

6

623

Farm Value

29

994,920.800

442,714.100

452,336

2,606,137

Acre Value

29

2,428.138

1,636.627

374

6,484

BoR Projects

29

0.828

1.537

0

6

The three dependent variables were derived from data collected from the Utah
Division of Water Rights database of irrigation companies. Each irrigation company has
a page on which several attributes of the company are recorded, including the county (or
counties) and water right area (or areas) in which they operate. Also included are the
main source of the company’s water, the number of irrigated acres serviced by the
company, the number of shares issued, the contact information for the operators and
owners of the company, and a list of all water rights owned by the company.
Attributes of the individual water rights include the priority date, source, and
amount, defined as either a quantity (acre-feet) or flow (defined as cubic feet per second).
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The total acre-feet or CFS controlled by a company can be calculated by adding these
rights together.
Frequently, an irrigation company’s DWR page will contain comments from
DWR employees. These comments often spell out the unique forms of governance used
by the company. The DWR also occasionally indicates if a company has been sold to
another company or is defunct. Utah has roughly 1100 irrigation companies, but almost
half of these companies are listed as owning no rights, issuing no shares, and irrigating
zero acres. I did not include these companies in the calculations to create the dependent
variable. Also omitted from the data were the eight irrigation companies that span more
than one county.
The three dependent variables are intended to test how much irrigation companies
in a county have internalized transaction costs. Because this is difficult to observe
directly, I use three dependent variables as proxies for transaction cost internalization.
The first dependent variable, acre-feet per company, was calculated by adding the acrefeet of every irrigation company in a county and then dividing that by the total number of
irrigation companies in that county. In other words, this variable measures the average
quantity of water (defined as acre-feet) controlled by an irrigation company in a county.
If it is the case that as this measure increases that transaction costs have been more
internalized, then this variable can serve as a proxy.
The second and third dependent variables are based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), a common measure of market concentration. It works by taking the market
share of all companies in an industry (40% market share = 40, for example), squaring
them, and then adding them. The final value is a number between 0 and 10,000. Values
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between 1,500 and 2,500 are considered by the US Justice Department to be "moderately
concentrated", and values greater than 2,500 are considered "highly concentrated"
(United States Department of Justice, 2015).
Two HHIs are used as the second and third dependent variables. One defines
market share as the percentage of acre-feet controlled by an irrigation company in a
county, and the other defines market share as the percentage of irrigated acreage in a
country that is served by an irrigation company. The market shares of each irrigation
company in a county are then squared and summed to create a total HHI for the county.
In the context of irrigation companies, if a higher HHI value is correlated with a higher
degree of internalization of transaction costs, then these variables can serve as proxies. In
other words, the more concentrated the market for water is in a few irrigation companies,
the more transaction costs of prior appropriation have been internalized.
The main independent variable of interest, precipitation, was calculated by adding
the monthly average precipitation in a county to get a yearly total average. Snow inches
were converted to rain inches by dividing the total by 10, a commonly accepted
conversion rate (Madaus, 2010). This is the variable of interest because a negative
relationship between precipitation and the three previously discussed implies an
association between aridity and the need to internalize the transaction costs of prior
appropriation.
The other independent variables are the population of each county; subsidy per
farm, or the value in government funds received by the average farm in the county; the
median farm size, in acres; farm sales, or the value of sales of all agricultural products for
the average farm in a county; the estimated total value of the average farm in a county,
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including land and building values; and the estimated value of the average farm acre in a
county, also including land and building values and finally, the number of dams built by
the Bureau of Reclamation in a county.
Population was chosen as an independent variable because counties tended to be
settled in greater numbers when they had more water available. This data was collected
from the State of Utah’s 2014 estimates (Governor’s Office of Management and Budget,
2015). The number of dams built by the Bureau of Reclamation was included because
irrigation companies may depend on Reclamation water through contracts with irrigation
districts. This data was collected from the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau of
Reclamation, 2018).
The financial variables, including subsidy per farm, median farm value, farm
sales, farm value, and acre value are all intended to test for an association with the value
of farms in particular regions with irrigation company control of water. It is possible that
the value of farms in a region motivate the internalization of transaction costs, not
precipitation. Finally, the median farm size is included because some agricultural activity,
such as cattle ranching, can require less water but more land, which may affect the
decision to place water in under the control of irrigation companies. The financial and
farm size data was collected from the USDA 2012 Census of Agriculture (United States
Department of Agriculture, 2012).
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 are regression tables that show the results of these tests.
Table 2 shows all three dependent variables regressed against all of the independent
variables. Table 3 shows eight regressions with the dependent variable acre-feet per
company and the independent variable precipitation, along with a single additional
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independent variable. This process is repeated in tables 4 and 5, with the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) defined in terms of acre-feet as the dependent variable in table 4,
and the HHI defined in terms of acreage as the dependent variable in table 5. Robust
standard errors were used in all regressions.
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Table 2
Average County Acre-feet per Company, County HHI Defined as Acre-feet, and County HHI
Defined as Acreage

Acre-feet per Company

Acre-feet - HHI

Acreage - HHI

-329.353**
(124.259)

-121.586**
(57.105)

-140.134*
(72.686)

Population

0.004
(0.003)

-0.003
(0.002)

-0.002
(0.002)

Subsidy per Farm

0.218
(0.253)

0.139
(0.196)

-0.125
(0.219)

Median Farm Size

-7.701
(10.696)

0.626
(5.820)

-9.511
(6.600)

Farm Sales

-0.007
(0.004)

0.005**
(0.002)

-0.005**
(0.003)

Farm Value

-0.003
(0.003)

-0.003*
(0.001)

0.005**
(0.002)

Acre Value

-0.807
(0.838)

-0.275
(0.316)

0.159
(0.402)

386.213
(428.588)

-474.667*
(242.060)

-756.841**
(325.433)

13,647.590***
(4,693.480)

9,974.389***
(1,987.600)

5,806.062***
(1,770.344)

Precipitation

BoR Projects

Constant

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3
Average County Acre-feet per Company

Precipitation

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-258.469**
(114.327)

-269.470**
(119.858)

-258.999**
(117.726)

-289.705**
(127.447)

-318.832**
(128.598)

-290.611**
(122.545)

-237.473**
(107.649)

-279.940**
(104.732)

Population

0.002
(0.001)

Subsidy per Farm

-0.016
(0.180)

Median Farm Size

-10.519*
(5.372)

Farm Sales

-0.010**
(0.004)

Farm Value

-0.003***
(0.001)

Acre Value

-0.328
(0.544)

BoR Projects

Constant

Note:

554.434*
(300.888)
8,867.960***
(3,017.212)

8,909.508***
(3,094.952)

9,010.185**
(3,555.811)

10,261.050***
(3,558.769)

11,191.430***
(3,542.739)

12,796.330***
(3,905.613)

9,259.259**
(3,347.615)

8,823.660***
(3,000.781)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 4
County HHI Defined as Acre-feet

Precipitation

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-180.147***
(47.837)

-163.815***
(46.633)

-179.059***
(48.818)

-182.341***
(50.709)

-161.766***
(50.583)

-188.299***
(49.950)

-162.679***
(51.009)

-164.100***
(52.305)

Population

-0.002*
(0.001)

Subsidy per Farm

0.034
(0.135)

Median Farm Size

-0.739
(3.425)

Farm Sales

0.003**
(0.001)

Farm Value

-0.001
(0.001)

Acre Value

-0.273
(0.265)

BoR Projects

Constant

Note:

-414.363*
(233.959)
8,567.702***
(1,082.186)

8,506.016***
(1,055.738)

8,275.527***
(1,448.820)

8,665.561***
(1,212.795)

7,860.200***
(1,266.321)

9,563.975***
(1,481.946)

8,893.244***
(1,233.457)

8,600.810***
(1,132.598)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 5
County HHI Defined as Acreage

Precipitation

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-151.515***

-145.370***

-151.830***

-150.525***

-162.688***

-135.163**

-145.080**

-128.331**

(50.881)

(51.733)

(50.500)

(52.681)

(53.951)

(52.768)

(58.635)

(56.505)

Population

-0.001
(0.001)

Subsidy per Farm

-0.010
(0.132)

Median Farm Size

0.333
(3.707)

Farm Sales

-0.002
(0.002)

Farm Value

0.002*
(0.001)

Acre Value

-0.101
(0.337)

BoR Projects

-598.653**
(248.463)

Constant

Note:

7,750.798***

7,727.587***

7,835.398***

7,706.633***

8,180.877***

5,752.196***

7,870.722***

7,798.631***

(1,139.275)

(1,149.388)

(1,290.042)

(1,252.833)

(1,278.526)

(1,603.312)

(1,227.985)

(1,172.905)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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RESULTS
In every regression, precipitation is negatively correlated with the dependent variables,
meaning that a decrease in the average precipitation of a county is associated with an increase in
the average acre-feet controlled by a company, as well as an increase in a county’s HerfindahlHirschman Index defined in terms of acre-feet and acreage. Not all regressions show the same
degree of significance, nor do they show the same magnitude of effect. All have the same
direction for the coefficient on the precipitation variable, however, and in all cases but one the
precipitation variable is significant to at least p<0.05, and in the single exception it is significant
to p<0.1.
The differences between the regressions appear to be mainly driven by the choice of
dependent variable. The most robust dependent variable appears to be the HHI defined in terms
of acre-feet, as all but one of the regressions that use this variable are significant to p<0.01. This
result makes theoretical sense, as HHI defined in terms of acre-feet represents what is traded in
irrigation companies (water), as opposed to HHI defined in terms of acreage. HHI defined in
terms of acre-feet also makes use of a technique that places greater importance on the presence
of large firms, as opposed to the dependent variable acre-feet per company, which is just a
simple average.
The results suggest that aridity may have an effect on the opportunity cost of prior
appropriation relative to shares, and is empirical evidence that supports the conclusions of prior
theoretical work suggesting that transaction costs increase under prior appropriation when water
is scarce. This, however, is not the only possible explanation for the data. Ownership of water
may be more concentrated in drier regions if water itself is more concentrated in a few sources.
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A better statistical test would look at how ownership of water rights has changed over time, but
historical streamflow data can be wildly inconsistent from year to year, and water rights data can
be incomplete, making a time series analysis unlikely to yield meaningful results.
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DISCUSSION
As stated earlier, irrigation companies have found many unique ways of internalizing the
transaction costs associated with prior appropriation. While they typically redefine their water
rights as shares, the particular rights associated with owning a share vary from company to
company. Shares can represent a quantity of acre-feet, a percentage of a water source’s flow, or a
quantity of time to access a source at a defined flow rate. Additionally, irrigation companies may
have unique ways of allocating their water locally.
The Utah Division of Water Rights publishes information about each individual irrigation
company, including occasional notes left by DWR employees that detail the unique ways that
water rights are defined within the company. For example, in a note about the Ricks Creek
Irrigation Company, an employee recounts a phone conversation with the company president:
There are two sides to the creek: North and South. Weber Basin WCD owns most of the South side
water. The LDS church owns some South side water, Bill Rigby owns 80 shares North side, his
brother owns about 24 shares, or hours, North, or something like that. [...] George has some stock,
probably 24 hours, but they can’t find the certificates (Utah Division of Water Rights, 2012).

Local knowledge appears crucial to the management of some irrigation companies. This
includes local knowledge about the layout of water infrastructure, as implied by this comment on
the Henefer Irrigation Company:
[T]he company`s shares are worth 3 acre-feet each; usually when someone hooks up to the city water
they turn over a third of a share valued at 1 acre-foot; and the number of shares in the company is 975.
[...] I see the slight inconsistency with this valuation compared to the 1157.5 acres the water right says
it is worth, but I guess the difference is made up on the ground with the availability / unavailability of
water and the need for some carriage water to stay in the ditches to the end of the line (Utah Division
of Water Rights, 2011).

Many companies issue shares that change depending on the streamflow, such as the East
Bench Canal Company (Utah Division of Water Rights, 2014). Others issue different classes of
shares with more or less exposure to drought risk, as does the La Sal Irrigation Company, whose
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acre-feet per share amounts are dependent on the yearly runoff (Utah Division of Water Rights,
2016a). Different classes of shares can also be defined for times of the year, as in the Indianola
Irrigation Company, where, “Class A shares are entitled to receive water, if it is available, for the
entire irrigation season. Class B shares are high water shares to divert early season flood water as
it may be available without reducing the water allocated to the Class A shares” (Utah Division of
Water Rights, 2016b).
The water source also matters for how the rights can be used. Bureau of Reclamation
water is generally restricted to agricultural uses, as noted in this comment for the Enterprise and
Stoddard Irrigation Company:
Bench Canal Stock CANNOT be used for domestic, industrial, or municipal purposes. Bench Canal
shares are based on Echo Reservoir storage, which has restrictive covenants under the Weber River
Project (Bureau of Reclamation) to be used solely for agricultural purposes [...] Contrast this with
Field Ditch shares, which are based on Weber River Decree 180 [...] and which may be changed more
freely. (Utah Division of Water Rights, 2013)

Irrigation companies that do not use Reclamation water are more able to sell their water
to higher valued uses, including municipal and industrial users. Some irrigation companies have
even been bought entirely by cities, such as the Granite Water Company, which was purchased
by Sandy (an urban suburb of Salt Lake City) in 2010 (Utah Division of Water Rights, 2011).
As urban populations grow, transfers of water from agricultural to urban users may
become increasingly valuable. Libecap (2011) argues that if current projections of long-term
decreased precipitation and snowpack due to climate change are correct, some form of adaptation
will be necessary, and water markets, if they function well, should be able to mitigate water
supply uncertainty. Transfers of water from agricultural to urban uses will be necessary to
accommodate and encourage the significant economic and population growth of the American
West. Thompson (1993) notes, however, that irrigation districts “have often opposed and
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successfully blocked such trades” (p. 703). Blocked sales are generally more likely to occur in
large irrigation districts where property rights are less clearly defined and less easily traded than
in irrigation companies.
The challenges of large irrigation districts that prevent their users from transferring water,
often for political reasons, can be contrasted with the many irrigation companies that allow users
who are not members to purchase their shares, which allows water to be transferred outside of
the original set of irrigators who formed the company. Irrigation companies with this structure
have allowed many transfers of water from agriculture to urban users, especially in Utah and
Colorado (Thompson, 1993). Because water in an irrigation district is owned more collectively,
an outside trade from an irrigation district may harm the other members of the district while only
benefitting the seller. An irrigation company, however, internalizes both the profits and losses to
buyers and sellers of shares (Thompson, 1993).
Furthermore, the mechanisms by which outside trades can be prevented in irrigation
companies and irrigation districts differ. In an irrigation company that allows the sale of shares to
municipal users, for example, an irrigator who wishes to prevent an outside sale must purchase
the share at the market price. In an irrigation district, however, an irrigator who wishes to prevent
an outside sale only needs to vote to prevent it. Irrigators in an irrigation district may be able to
prevent trades where the benefit to the irrigator of preventing the outside sale is less than the
gains from trade to the seller and buyer, a situation unlikely to occur when irrigators are forced to
face the full costs of preventing trade.
If irrigation companies are indeed redefining appropriative rights as a response to water
scarcity, then irrigation companies will likely continue to be important adaptive institutions in
the event of climate change-induced water scarcity. Unfortunately, local resource governance
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institutions can be threatened by policymakers who impose one-size-fits all solutions that crowd
out, or even destroy local adaptations (Ostrom, 1990). Building additional water projects in an
effort to overcome the problems of water scarcity may delay and obscure the price signals that
irrigation companies rely on. This danger is made real by policymakers who face political
incentives, rather than market incentives. Conspicuous structures of concrete and steel that hold
back lakes or networks of pipelines that move water over, around, and through mountain ranges
may provide policymakers with political benefits while simultaneously preventing local
institutions from adapting to water scarcity. For example, Garrick, Whitten and Coggan (2013)
point to the case of a series of droughts in the Colorado River Basin, which, while prompting
minor reforms that allowed for more flexible markets, also resulted in maladaptive
“infrastructure investments and water-use patterns that reinforced powerful vested interests and
raised the costs of future institutional transitions” (p. 202).
Overbuilding infrastructure may also be constrained by the limited ability to supply new
water at any price. As additional projects hit hard resource limits that no feasible dams or
pipelines could overcome, access to additional water through institutional change will be more
attractive. Unfortunately, designing institutions that can evolve with changing circumstances
may be an especially difficult task when institutional change requires buy-in from powerful
interests with an incentive to become vested in the new institutional arrangement. In light of this,
policymakers should be especially careful to avoid destroying existing institutions and
organizations that successfully adapt to water scarcity.
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CONCLUSION
The colonizers of the American West were faced with tremendous geographic, climatic,
and institutional challenges that forced them to repeatedly innovate new institutions and forms of
governance, first from riparian rights to prior appropriation, and then from prior appropriation to
irrigation companies. Those regions with the most water scarcity, and therefore the most to gain
from trade, internalized the transaction costs of prior appropriation to a greater extent. Irrigators
organized to solve the collective action problems of water trade, creating vibrant markets that
allow water to be freely traded between agricultural users, but some of these same organizations,
primarily irrigation districts, have evolved into special interest groups that prevent water from
being traded to more valuable urban uses. This paper offers evidence that institutional adaptation
in water resources is associated with water scarcity. As a growing population and changing
climate continue to affect water scarcity, allowing for continued adaptation will be crucial to
using water resources efficiently.
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